

Message Text

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ACTION IO-06

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2367

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 0383

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UNSC, US, SF, RH, WA

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES

1. GIVEN THE PARAMOUNT FOCUS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE UNITED NATIONS AT THIS TIME, AND THE USG'S DEDICATION TO ASSIST IN THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THESE QUESTIONS, WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING THOUGHTS CONCERNING RHODESIA, NAMIBIA, AND APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA.

2. WE ALSO INCLUDE OUR VIEWS REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF THESE ISSUES IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. IT IS THAT FORUM IN WHICH THESE QUESTIONS ARE LIKELY TO RECEIVE THEIR NEXT BROAD HEARING, IN MARCH, WITH THE US AS SC PRESIDENT. UN MEMBERS ANXIOUSLY AWAIT THAT OCCASION TO SEE, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME, EVIDENCE OF FRESH APPROACHES ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS BY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION.

3. RHODESIA - WASHINGTON IS WELL AWARE OF THE ALTERNATIVES RELATING TO THIS CONTINUING PROBLEM. CLEARLY, THEY INVOLVE:

---A. CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE BRITISH IN THEIR EFFORTS, INTER ALIA ADVANCING NEW PROPOSALS WHICH MAY STAND A BETTER CHANCE OF ACCEPTANCE;

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---B. THE US GETTING OUT IN FRONT OF THE BRITISH IN PROMOTING A SOLUTION;

---C. ENTERING A "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD WHILE THE VARIOUS SIDES ADJUST TO THE REALITIES;

---D. CONCLUDING THAT NOTHING MORE IS TO BE DONE ON THE NEGOTIATING FRONT, AND HOPING FOR A QUICK MILITARY RESOLUTION IN FAVOR OF THE NATIONALIST FORCES.

4. WE OPT FOR OPTION A. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BOLSTER BRITISH EFFORTS. WE SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO COME UP WITH A PLAN WHICH COULD ACCOMMODATE FEARS ON BOTH RHODESIAN SIDES REGARDING THE "BLOCKING THIRD", WHICH PROPOSAL THEN COULD BE ADVANCED BY THE BRITISH. BRITISH EFFORTS SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ADDITIONAL US, (EC-9, AND JAPANESE) PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA AND ON RHODESIA ITSELF. WE REJECT OPTION B SINCE MOST AFRICANS WISH THE BRITISH TO REMAIN OUT IN FRONT AND BASICALLY THE BRITISH, TOO, WANT US IN A SUPPORTIVE POSITION. THERE SIMPLY IS NOT ENOUGH TIME FOR OPTION C, GIVEN THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY; THE EVENTUALITIES OF OPTION D REALLY ARE PREFERRED BY NO WELL-WISHER AT ALL.

5. INDEPENDENTLY, THE US SHOULD MOVE AHEAD ON REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT AND SHOULD APPLY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE RHODESIAN INFORMATION OFFICE IN WASHINGTON.

6. IDEALLY, A WIDE-RANGING DEBATE ON RHODESIA IN THE SC SHOULD BE AVOIDED FOR THE TIME BEING. SUCH A DEBATE COULD RESULT IN PRESSURES FOR THE FULL APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41, WHICH WE MIGHT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN SUPPORTING. WE WOULD WISH, NEVERTHELESS, TO CONTINUE PRESSURE ON RHODESIA AS FAR AS UN SANCTIONS ARE CONCERNED. BY APPLYING THAT PRESSURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AMONG OTHER RESULTS WE WILL MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE USG REMAINS CONCERNED. THE BRITISH HERE HAVE BEEN CONFIDENT THAT, OCCUPYING THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SC FOR FEBRUARY, THEY COULD RESTRICT

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A DEBATE ON RHODESIA THIS MONTH TO A NARROW DISCUSSION OF THE EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS TO EXCLUDE TRANSFERS FROM RHODESIA OF FUNDS FOR OFFICIAL PURPOSES. ALTHOUGH THE BRITISH HAVE ACQUIESCED TO OUR REQUEST FOR DELAY IN PURSUING THIS INITIATIVE AND APPARENTLY HAVE SOME PROBLEMS OF THEIR OWN CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE APPLICATION OF SUCH A RESOLUTION TO AFFECT PENSION TRANSFERS, THE FRENCH NO LONGER APPEAL RELUCTANT TO HAVE THE COUNCIL MEET (FOLLOWING THEIR CLOSURE OF THE RHODESIAN INFORMATION OFFICE IN PARIS). CURRENTLY, IT IS THE US WHICH IS, FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, DELAYING A DEBATE WHICH MIGHT NEVERTHELESS PROVE FAVORABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

7. WE SUGGEST THAT WE PROCEED NOW TO MODIFY THE BRITISH LANGUAGE WITH WHICH WE HAVE DIFFICULTIES (STATE 20522), AND TELL HMG THAT, ON THE BASIS OF OUR NEW LANGUAGE, WE HAVE NO FURTHER OBJECTION TO PURSUING A DEBATE NOW (LIMITED IN SCOPE TO THAT QUESTION). PASSAGE OF SUCH A RESOLUTION ALSO WOULD ENABLE US TO

APPLY ADDITIONAL PRESSURE ON THE RHODESIAN INFORMATION OFFICE IN WASHINGTON. COUPLED WITH HOPED-FOR REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT, WE THEREBY WILL HAVE APPLIED DESIRABLE PRESSURE, POSSIBLY BOUGHT TIME TO PROCEED WITH THE BRITISH ON NECESSARY EFFORTS TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS, AND GAINED GOOD WILL IN THE PROCESS.

8. NAMIBIA - WE BELIEVE THAT THE US SHOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE SAM NUJOMA OF SWAPO TO COME TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE. GIVEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FRAMEWORK STILL CAN BE CONSTRUCTED WHEREBY NUJOMA'S DESIDERATA CONCERNING NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE ACCOMMODATED, NUJOMA MUST BE PRODDED TO REALIZE THE VERY STRONG POSITION IN WHICH HE WOULD BE BY ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS UNDER THE UN AEGIS. NUJOMA APPARENTLY IS CONCERNED THAT REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS, HIS LEADERSHIP POSITION IN NAMIBIA ITSELF IS NOT QUITE AS SECURE AS THE OAU AND UN DESCRIBE IT. NUJOMA
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SHOULD BE MADE TO REALIZE, HOWEVER, THAT TURNING INSTEAD TO A MILITARY SOLUTION NOT ONLY WOULD LENGTHEN HIS STRUGGLE BUT, BY CALLING UPON OUTSIDE SUPPORT, HE COULD WELL EMERGE LESS INDEPENDENT IN HIS DECISIONS THAN HE IS NOW.

9. SUCH A MEANINGFUL FRAMEWORK FOR PROCEEDING MAY WELL EXIST IN SC RESOLUTION 385 OF JANUARY 30, 1976. OPERATIVE PARAS 7, 8, 9 AND 11B HAVE PARTICULAR PARALLELS TO SWAPO NEGOTIATING DEMANDS. AT THE SAME TIME, AND MINDFUL OF SC FAILURE TO MOVE BEYOND THAT RESOLUTION, WE SUGGEST THAT WE NOT BECOME UNREASONABLY WEDDED TO ITS LANGUAGE, ALTHOUGH ITS POSSIBILITIES AS AN INITIAL FRAMEWORK DO COMMEND IT. OTHER OPTIONS, OF ENDEAVORING TO SUPPORT TURNHALLE, OPPOSING THE APPLICATION OF CHAPTER VII TO NAMIBIA, OR SIMPLY DOING LITTLE AT ALL, SEEM ANACHRONISTIC.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2368

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USUN 0383

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10. BILATERALLY, THE UNITED STATES ALSO SHOULD MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF REVOKING TAX CREDITS FOR AMERICAN COMPANIES INVESTING IN NON-INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA. FURTHER, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR OBJECTIVES COULD BE ADVANCED BY A POSITIVE US ROLE CONCERNING NAMIBIA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. DESPITE CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE IN NEW YORK ADVOCATING SC APPLICATION OF CHAPTER VII TO SOUTH AFRICA OVER ITS POLICY OF APARTHEID, AND IN FAVOR OF DOING SO THIS MARCH, WE BELIEVE THAT INSTEAD WE SHOULD PRESS FORWARD ON THE FAR MORE DEFENSIBLE CASE OF APPLYING CHAPTER VII IN THE CONTEXT OF NAMIBIA. SHOULD WE BE ABLE TO AGREE ON SUCH A POLICY AHEAD OF TIME -- AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO RATIONALIZE ITS AVOIDANCE -- WE FEEL AFRICANS AT THE UN WOULD BE AMENABLE TO ACCEPTING A PROPOSAL FOR A NAMIBIA DEBATE IN MARCH PRIOR TO DEALING WITH THE APARTHEID QUESTION. DURING THE NAMIBIA DEBATE, WE COULD ENDORSE A MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO UNDER CHAPTER VII, WHILE DELAYING THE APPLICATION OF OTHER MEASURES UNDER THAT CHAPTER. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO REMAIN IN TOUCH WITH THE UK AND FRANCE CONCERNING OUR THINKING. SHOULD ONE OR BOTH NOT BE ENTHUSIASTIC CONCERNING CHAPTER VII, WE THEN WILL BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO DECIDE WHETHER TO LEAD OR FOLLOW OUR ALLIES CONCERNING NAMIBIA (AND APARTHEID). IT IS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT
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BY SHOWING SOUTH AFRICA WE CLEARLY MEAN BUSINESS, OUR ACTION WOULD BE RECEIVED VERY FAVORABLY IN NEW YORK AND THEREBY COULD ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO ASSIST IN EFFORTS TO INDUCE NUJOMA (AND THE SAG) TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE, IN A CRUCIAL EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA.

11. APARTHEID - HERE, THE REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES SEEM TO BE APPLYING UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA ON ONE HAND OR, ON THE OTHER, LINKING IN THE SAG'S MIND FORWARD PROGRESS BY PRETORIA CONCERNING RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA WITH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WILL NOT PUSH THEM NOW ON APARTHEID. WE WOULD REJECT SUCH A LINKAGE. THE THREE MATTERS SHOULD BE TREATED INDEPENDENTLY. IN HIS FIRST OFFICIAL MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG IN NEW YORK, TANZANIAN PERM REP SALIM APPEALED TO US TO

AVOID HAVING THE IMPRESSION CONVEYED TO THE SAG THAT SOMEHOW IT IS A PARTNER OF THE WEST IN EFFECTING CHANGES ON OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS. THE POINT COULD BE MADE TO VORSTER THAT "OTHERS" MAY PERCEIVE THE SOUTH AFRICANS AS PROGRESS-ORIENTED ON APARTHEID SHOULD THEY ASSIST IN FAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS ELSEWHERE, BUT THE IMPRESSION SHOULD BE AVOIDED THAT THE US IS GUARANTEEING VORSTER ANYTHING. AS DISCUSSIONS WITH VORSTER ALREADY HAVE SHOWN, HE APPEARS AWARE THAT IT WOULD BE IN HIS INTEREST TO HAVE AN ACCOMMODATION REACHED IN RHODESIA SOONER, RATHER THAN LATER. HIS CHANCES OF HAVING A "MODERATE" NEIGHBOR IN ZIMBABWE ARE LESSENED SHOULD LENGTHY MILITARY OPERATIONS ENSUE. HE ALSO SEEMS AWARE THAT THE LONGER SUCH MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS DRAG ON, WITH PREDICTABLE WHITE LOSSES, SO WILL BE INCREASED DOMESTIC SOUTH AFRICAN PRESSURES ON HIM TO INTERVENE ON THE SIDE OF SMITH. SUCH AWARENESS IS BORNE OUT BY RECENT PRIVATE VORSTER STATEMENTS. VORSTER THEREFORE IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE HIS PRESSURES ON SMITH WITH HIS OWN INTERESTS IN MIND, NOT REQUIRING ANY QUID PRO QUO FROM US. SIMILARLY, ON NAMIBIA, IF VORSTER CAN BE IMPRESSED THAT A TURNHALLE SOLUTION CLEARLY WOULD NOT

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BE MARKETABLE AND WOULD LEAD TO (AT THE LEAST) GUERRILLA ATTACKS ON AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA WHICH SOUTH AFRICA MIGHT BE MILITARILY BOUND TO DEFEND, HE COULD BECOME MORE UNDERSTANDING -- AGAIN, WITHOUT ANY QUID PRO QUO NECESSARY. AS REGARDS APARTHEID, JOHN VORSTER MUST BE AWARE THAT THERE WILL BE MANY MORE SOWETOS. WHETHER HE CAN BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMAGEDDON WILL COME UNLESS DOMESTIC POLICIES ARE CHANGED OR WHETHER HE WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT SUCH CHANGES THEMSELVES WILL BRING ON THAT ARMAGEDDON, WE SHOULD LIMIT OURSELVES TO ADVANCING OUR OWN POSITION THAT CHANGE IS NEEDED AND THAT FURTHER BLOODSHED IS INEVITABLE SHOULD THAT CHANGE NOT COME. SUCH SHOULD BE THE CRUX OF OUR ARGUMENT TO VORSTER: THE BITTER PILL SHOULD NOT BE SUGARCOATED. ACCORDINGLY, NO NEW BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE USG WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AND A USG REVIEW SHOULD BEGIN CONCERNING ALL EXISTING TIES. A WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF AMERICAN COMPANIES INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD BE CONVOKED TO STUDY THE APPLICATION OF PRESSURES FOR CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

12. AGAIN, WE WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OUT BRITISH AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES IN ORDER THAT A WORKABLE POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA MAY BE DEVELOPED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST BEAR IN MIND THAT WE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE MOVING TOWARD A SITUATION, AS POSSIBLY ON NAMIBIA, WHERE WE WILL HAVE TO CHOOSE BETWEEN LEADING OR FOLLOWING OUR

ALLIES.

13. IN NEW YORK, A PRIOR APPLICATION OF CHAPTER VII AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA CONCERNING NAMIBIA COULD BE USED TO ARGUE AGAINST A POSSIBLY MORE DIFFICULT (CONSTITUTIONALLY AND OTHERWISE) APPLICATION IN THE CASE OF APARTHEID. WE WOULD ADVOCATE, NEVERTHELESS, PURSUING AN APARTHEID DEBATE IN THE SC AFTER THE NAMIBIA DEBATE IS COMPLETED. WHILE AS A MISSION WE HAVE SYMPATHY FOR MOVING FORWARD ON THE "SWEDISH
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PROPOSAL" DURING THAT DEBATE, WE WOULD NOT BE AVERSE INSTEAD TO ANNOUNCING AT THAT TIME THAT WASHINGTON WAS EFFECTING FIRST A POLICY OF ENCOURAGING PRESSURE TO BE EXERTED BY AMERICAN COMPANIES INVESTING IN SOUTH AFRICA. GIVEN OUR PREVIOUS TREATMENT IN THE COUNCIL OF RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED ABOVE, THE COUNCIL COULD NOT FAIL TO BE IMPRESSED ALSO BY A STRONG US STATEMENT OF OUR POLICY ON APARTHEID, SETTING FORTH OUR DETERMINATION TO ASSIST ACTIVELY IN ITS ELIMINATION. CONDEMNATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM TRIALS ABOUT TO BEGIN SHORTLY IN SOUTH AFRICA (PRETORIA 400) WOULD HELP IN THIS REGARD. IT IS VERY POSSIBLE THAT SUCH STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS, COUPLED WITH CHAPTER VII ALREADY HAVING BEEN INVOKED AS CONCERNS NAMIBIA, COULD DELAY FOR A USEFUL PERIOD OTHER SC MEASURES AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA, WHICH MEASURES ACTUALLY COULD PROVE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO OUTSIDE BILATERAL EFFORTS. BUT AGAIN, WE WOULD REJECT ANY IMPLICIT LINKAGE BEING MADE IN OUR DEALINGS WITH SOUTH AFRICA TO THE EFFECT THAT DELAY ON APARTHEID WAS BEING OFFERED IN EXCHANGE FOR STEPS ELSEWHERE.
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